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Abstract
A generalized quantum theoretical framework, not restricted to
the validity domain of standard quantum physics, is used to model
the dynamics of the bistable perception of ambiguous visual stimuli.
The central idea is to treat the perception process in terms of the
evolution of an unstable two-state quantum system, yielding a quan-
tum Zeno type of effect. A quantitative relation between the involved
time scales is theoretically derived. This relation is found to be satis-
fied by empirically obtained cognitive time scales relevant for bistable
perception.
1
1 Introduction
Quantum theory has revolutionized our understanding of the physical world
in both scientific and epistemological respects. It was developed in the third
decade of the 20th century as a theory describing the behavior of atomic
systems. Subsequently, its range of validity turned out to be much wider.
Not only are nuclei and elementary particles, more than seven orders of mag-
nitude smaller than atomic systems, governed by quantum theory, but also
macroscopic phenomena like superconductivity or superfluidity are success-
fully described in quantum theoretical terms.
¿From the present state of knowledge, the broad validity of quantum the-
ory in physics is not surprising. Investigations of its conceptual structure and
axiomatic foundations have revealed that quantum theory is a logical conse-
quence of some rather simple and plausible basic assumptions on the nature
of observables and states of physical systems. In this framework, classical
physics results from basically one additional assumption: the commutativity
of the algebra of observables. On the other hand, the axiomatic framework
has shown how deeply rooted apparently bizarre concepts of quantum theory
like complementarity and entanglement really are, and that there is no way
back to classical concepts on a fundamental level of physical description.
Since the early days of quantum theory, starting with Niels Bohr, the idea
has been entertained that quantum theoretical concepts like complementarity
and entanglement might be meaningful and important even beyond the realm
of the physical world in its strict sense. Concerning such “quantum-like”
phenomena, encorporating complementarity or entanglement beyond physics,
three different stances, not completely exclusive with respect to each other
from a logical point of view, are possible and have found proponents.
1. The application of quantum theoretical concepts to non-physical situa-
tions is merely metaphoric and not elucidated in a precise and general
way. The analogies are selected ad hoc and change with the given
situation.
2. In the spirit of a strict physicalism, everything can be reduced to
physics. There is nothing left beyond the world of physics, and quantum-
like phenomena as adressed above are simply physical quantum phe-
nomena.
3. Assuming a non-reductive framework, it might be possible and ade-
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quate to describe vital features of parts of the world, physical or non-
physical, by a formalism isomorphic to the formalism of quantum the-
ory. This isomorphy may be total or, more often, partial, such that only
particular features of the quantum theoretical formalism are realized
in a non-physical context.
An approach within option (3), denoted as weak quantum theory, was
recently proposed on an axiomatic basis [2]. The starting point in this ap-
proach is the algebraic formulation of quantum theory, where the observables
of a physical system generate a C∗-algebra A, and the states of the system
are positive linear functionals on A. A careful analysis of this formulation
shows that its axioms are not equally fundamental. They can be sifted out
into general, indispensable axioms, applying to any (physical or non-physical)
system as long as it is a possible object of meaningful investigation, and more
special axioms used in quantum physical applications only.
The most general formal system thus arising, in which concepts like com-
plementarity and entanglement are still meaningful, is a minimal version of
weak quantum theory. In short, it can be described in the following way (for
details we refer to [2]):
The notions of system, observables, and states remain unchanged. Ob-
servables are identified with functions mapping states to states. This empha-
sizes the importance of observables as representing active processes with the
capacity of changing states, which is vital in quantum theory.
Observables, conceived as functions, can be composed. This composition
defines a multiplication of observables endowing the set of all observables with
the simple structure of a semigroup. Two observables are incompatible, or
complementary with respect to each other, whenever they do not commute.
Entanglement can be rephrased as complementarity of a global observable
pertaining to a system as a whole and local observables pertaining to its
parts. Propositions are special observables related to yes-no-questions about
the system.
The minimal, most general formal system of weak quantum theory can be
stepwise supplemented and enriched up to isomorphy with the full quantum
theory used in physics. In its minimal form, weak quantum theory, although
it implies complementarity and entanglement, is vastly more general and
flexible than the full quantum theory. The main differences are:
• In the most general form of weak quantum theory, the sum of observ-
ables is not defined in an empirically meaningful way. As a consequence,
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there is no Hilbert space of states and no way to attribute probabilities
to the outcomes of measurements corresponding to the observables.
• Planck’s constant h, which determines the amount of non-commutativity
and complementarity in quantum physics, enters nowhere. This im-
plies that conspicuous quantum-like phenomena may be effective in
situations beyond standard quantum physics.
• Unlike in quantum theory, where Bell’s inequalities can be derived,
there is in general no way to rule out local realism. As a consequence,
indeterminacies and complementarities can be of epistemic rather than
ontic origin.
Quantum-like behavior as described by weak quantum theory or its re-
finements is expected for systems with complex internal organization. This
implies strong and intricate coupling of their parts and the practical im-
possibility of observation from outside without influencing the state of such
systems.
A paradigmatic example for such a situation is the cognitive system and
its neural correlates in the brain. This may be one of the reasons why quite
a number of approaches have been developed, in more or less detail, to relate
conscious activities to quantum theory or describe particular brain opera-
tions quantum theoretically. Besides the fairly popular approaches associated
with the names of von Neumann/Wigner/Stapp [31] and Penrose/Hameroff
[22], other interesting options have been proposed by Beck/Eccles [4] and
Umezawa/Vitiello [29].
All these approaches are essentially discussed within the usual quantum
physics. This is at variance with the strategy of weak quantum theory; a
recently discussed example refers to the perception of temporally subsequent
events [3]. This approach proposes a type of temporal entanglement which
is not contained in standard quantum physics, but can be formulated in the
theory of chaotic systems. In the present paper, we intend to apply the
framework of weak quantum theory to another scenario of cognitive science:
the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli.1
1Niels Bohr was familiar with the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli through his
psychologist friend Edgar Rubin. There are indications [24] that this fact, together with
Bohr’s studies of the writings of Harald Høffding and William James, played an important
role in the complicated genesis of his concept of complementarity in quantum physics.
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Bistable perception arises whenever a stimulus can be interpreted in two
different ways with approximately equal plausibility. A very simple and often
investigated example of bistable perception is the so-called Necker cube. (For
an overview concerning the current discussion of cognitive and neural features
of the perception of the Necker cube see [14, 15].) A grid of a cube in two-
dimensional representation can be perceived as a three dimensional-object in
two different perspectives, either as a cube seen from above or from below.
The perception of the Necker cube switches back and forth between the two
possible interpretations spontaneously and inevitably.
We propose to describe bistable perception with the formalism of a two-
state quantum system, where the two basis states correspond to the two dif-
ferent ways to interpret the visual stimulus. Measurement is considered as the
mental process determining in which way the figure is perceived. The switch-
ing between the different perceptions corresponds to the quantum transition
between the two states which are eigenstates of the operator representing a
particular perception and unstable under the time evolution of the system.
Such a description of bistable perception employs a non-minimal version
of weak quantum theory with a linear structure and a two-dimensional linear
state space. This version is fairly close to the structure of the full quan-
tum theory used in physics. This does not imply, however, that we propose
to understand bistable perception as a quantum phenomenon in the sense
that the related brain processes are usual quantum processes. (Planck’s con-
stant h will nowhere enter in our arguments.) Rather, we will discuss the
quantum-like behavior of bistable perception as a result of the truncation of
an extremely complicated system to a two-state system, into which the effect
of many uncontrolled variables and influences is lumped in a global way.
For this purpose, we consider a quantum mechanical system with a state
space spanned by two states ψ1 and ψ2, neither of which is an eigenstate of the
Hamiltonian H generating the evolution matrix U(t) = eiHt. If the system is
initially in the state ψ1 and allowed to evolve freely according to U(t), then
its state will oscillate between the states ψ1 and ψ2. This oscillation can be
slowed down by increasing the frequency at which the system is measured,
asking whether it still resides in its initial state. In the limit of continuous
measurement, the evolution of the system can be completely suppressed.
This phenomenon is known as the quantum Zeno effect.2
2See [12] for a review of theoretical and experimental results concerning the quantum
Zeno effect. Its possible cognitive significance was indicated previously by Stapp [32].
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In the following section 2, the quantum Zeno effect will be described in as
much detail as required for the purpose of this paper. The quantitative rela-
tion between different time scales of crucial significance will be emphasized
in particular. In section 3, cognitive time scales satisfying this relation will
be presented with particular respect to the dynamics of bistable perception.
Section 4 summarizes the results and concludes the article.
2 Quantum Zeno effect
The quantum Zeno effect was originally discussed as the quantum Zeno
“paradox”3 by Misra and Sudarshan [19] for the decay of unstable quantum
systems. As mentioned above, its key meaning is that repeated observations
of the system decelerate the time evolution which it would undergo with-
out observations, e.g. its decay. The metaphor “a watched pot never boils”
paraphrases this behavior in the limit of continuous observation.
The situation addressed in the following refers to a quantum system os-
cillating between two non-stationary states. For this purpose, we consider a
system with the following properties:
1. For convenience, a two-state system will be considered. (The results
apply to more general systems as well.)
2. An observation is represented by the operator
σ3 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
Immediately after an observation, the system will be in one of the
corresponding eigenstates
ψ1 = |+〉 =
(
1
0
)
or ψ2 = |−〉 =
(
0
1
)
.
3. Both σ3-eigenstates may also be represented by their projection oper-
ators
P+ =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and P− =
(
0 0
0 1
)
.
3The Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea proposed the following antinomy: “As long as
anything is in space equal to itself, it is at rest. An arrow is in a space equal to itself
at every moment in its flight, and therefore also during the whole of its flight. Thus the
flying arrow is at rest.” [6]
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4. Without loss of generality, the Hamilton operator giving rise to transi-
tions of the system can be written as
H = gσ1 = g
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
where g is a coupling constant. Hence, the unitary operator of time
evolution is represented by
U(t) = eiHt =
(
cos gt i sin gt
i sin gt cos gt
)
.
5. In this model, ∆T defines the time interval between two successive
observations, and T defines the time scale after which the state has
changed with 50% probability. Concerning the cognitive interpretation
of ∆T and T we refer to the next section. It is assumed that T/∆T =
N ≫ 1.
We now calculate the probability that an eigenstate of the observation op-
erator σ3 (representing the perception of the Necker cube) remains unchanged
after a time T = N∆T under the condition that repeated observations (mea-
surements of σ3) occur in time intervalls ∆T . For t = 0 we assume the system
to be in the eigenstate |+〉, and this state is confirmed after each observation.
The probability that the system is still in state |+〉 after time t is:
w(t) = |〈+|U(t)|+〉|2 = cos2 gt . (1)
This oscillation determines a characteristic time scale t0, given by the re-
quirement that the state of the system contains the eigenstates |+〉 and |−〉
with equal probability, corresponding to 1/8 of a period of the oscillation or
t0 = pi/4g.
By contrast, if the system is observed N times with time step ∆T , the
probability that it is still in state |+〉 after all N observations, each with the
result +, is given by
w(N) =
∣∣〈+|(P+U(∆T )P+)N |+〉∣∣2 = [cos(g∆T )]2N . (2)
This is simply the product of the survival probabilities for each individual
observation. The number of observations N after which the probability w(N)
decreases to 1/2 is given by
w(N) =
1
2
→ [cos(g∆T )]2N = 1
2
, (3)
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or
cos(g∆T ) = e−
1
2N
ln 2 .
According to N = T/∆T ≫ 1, the right hand side of this equation is close
to unity. Therefore, the argument of the cosine is close to zero and we may
expand the cosine function according to
(
1− (g∆T )
2
2
+ . . .
)
≈ 1− 1
2N
ln 2 + . . . (4)
or
g =
√
ln 2
N ∆T 2
=
√
ln 2
T ∆T
. (5)
In this way, the unknown coupling constant g is expressed by the experimen-
tally accessible quantities ∆T and T .
These quantities can be related to the evolution of the system under the
condition that no observations are performed. In this case, the time evolution
is given by U(t) and, as mentioned above, the state oscillates between the
two eigenstates |+〉 and |−〉 with period t0 = pi/4g. This leads to the relation
t0 =
pi
4
√
ln 2
√
T ∆T . (6)
between the three time scales involved. (Note that Planck’s action h is absent
in this relation. If at all, it would enter in g, but g is eliminated in eq. 6.)
The derivation of this relation depends on two arbitrary choices: T is
determined from the condition that the probability of state flipping is 1/2
(eq. 3) , and t0 is determined from the condition that the oscillating state is
a superposition of eigenstates of σ3 with equal coefficients (eq. 6). Even if
these conditions are varied, the general result
t0 = C
√
T∆T , (7)
remains unchanged (C ≈ 1; cf. eq. 6). It entails the following two predictions:
1. As long as the time interval ∆T between two observations is non-zero,
the states will spontaneously switch into each other after an average
time T , which is large compared to ∆T and t0.
2. The relation between the time scales T , ∆T and t0 is given by eq. 7.
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3 Cognitive time scales
In order to assign significance to the time scales T , ∆T and t0 in terms of the
process of bistable perception, corresponding cognitive time scales have to be
identified with particular respect to bistable perception. In this section, we
will argue that there are natural choices for T and ∆T . As a consequence,
t0 can be calculated, and its possible significance will be discussed.
3.1 T ≈ 3 sec
The perception of ambiguous visual stimuli is a prominent topic of modern
research in cognitive science and neurophysiology [17]. One of the elemen-
tary examples is a two-dimensional image of a three-dimensional cube, the
so-called Necker cube. The Swiss geologist Necker [20] first discovered that
the front-back orientation of the cube switches spontaneously. Since then,
numerous other stimuli have been studied generating the same basic phe-
nomenon. Due to its simplicity and, in comparison with other stimuli, fairly
low semantic content, the Necker cube remains one of the most popular ob-
jects for investigation.
There are two basically different approaches to study the perception of
ambiguous stimuli. The first one refers to the behavioral response to a stim-
ulus which is (assumed to be) based on psychological (mental) processes.
Measuring the frequency of reversals is a typical example. The second per-
spective is to look for neural correlates of psychological processes triggered
by stimuli, using either electrophysiological tools or, more recently, imaging
techniques.
One of the fairly invariant patterns, which the perception of ambigu-
ous stimuli presents, is a remarkably stable rate of reversals for individual
subjects, ranging between about 4 and 60 switches per minute for different
subjects [5]. This reversal rate corresponds to a “mean first passage time”
between 1 and 15 seconds. The duration after which the stimulus orienta-
tion spontaneously reverses was found to be gamma-distributed around a
maximum of about 3 seconds [7]. This time scale can straightforwardly be
attributed as the extended oscillation period T due to observations.
The time scale of approximately 3 seconds was not only found in the
bistable perception of visual stimuli, but also of auditory ambiguous stimuli.
For instance, the phoneme sequence BA-CU-BA-CU-... switches into CU-
BA-CU-BA-... after a corresponding time interval [28] . In addition, there are
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other features in perception, cognition, memory, and movement control for
which the 3 second interval is crucial. Here are some of the most conspicuous
observations, discussed in more detailed in [27]:
• length of lines in classical verse in different languages [13], also of
melody phrases;
• segmentation of spontaneous speech acts, i.e. closed verbal utterances
[16];
• rhythmic accentuation of successive beats within 3 second windows [35];
• length of spontaneous motor activity (e.g., scratching) in different mam-
malian species [10];
• information retrieving by short-time (working) memory within 3 second
windows [23]
• the reproduction of time intervals is overestimated for time intervals
smaller than 3 seconds, and underestimated for intervals greater than
3 seconds; the “indifference point” is at 3 seconds [26].
All these observations and more indicate that temporal segmentation into
3 second windows is a basic principle of many aspects of conscious activity.
Therefore Po¨ppel refers to single 3 second intervals as “states of being con-
scious” and emphasizes that the segmentation mechanism itself is automatic
and presemantic [27]. Such discrete successive states are semantically linked
with their predecessor and successor. The resulting subjective experience of
the continuity of consciousness is, thus, intimately related to the assignment
of meaning.
The ubiquity and the basic significance of the time scale of approximately
3 seconds suggests that T ≈ 3 sec is also significant for cognitive processes
beyond the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli. In the context of the
present article, however, the focus remains bistable perception of Necker type
stimuli, since it offers a scenario which is conceptually better defined and
experimentally better controllable than transitions between arbitrary other
mental representations.
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3.2 ∆T ' 30 msec
A reasonable estimate for the time between observations in the sense of the
quantum Zeno effect, ∆T , is difficult to obtain from the phenomenology of
bistable perception. It has to satisfy at least one condition: the perceptual
system must be able to assign a temporal sequence to successive events,
i.e. observations.
Experiments concerning the capabilities of discriminating and sequential-
izing temporally separate perceptual events have been carried out for a long
time [33]. A particular version of such experiments was reported by Po¨ppel
[25]. Exposing subjects to two successive separable (e.g. by frequency) stim-
uli and varying the time interval ∆t between them, three regimes of different
kinds of perception of the stimuli were observed.
For ∆t ≫ 30 msec, two different individual events are clearly separable,
and their sequence can be correctly assigned. For ∆t < 3 msec (in the
auditory modality), the two different events remain unresolved and, as a
consequence, a sequential order cannot be assigned to them. Most interesting
is the result for the regime 3 msec < ∆t < 30 msec. Here, two individual
different events can be discriminated, but their temporal sequence cannot
be assigned correctly (rather, the sequence assignment is more or less at
random). This implies that the discrimination of temporally distinct events
and their sequentialization are different perceptual capabilities.
These results, which were found for different sensory modalities [27, 30],
suggest the existence of two different kinds of temporal thresholds for the
discrimination and sequentialization of perceived events:
(1) a so-called fusion threshold (or transduction threshold) which can be in-
terpreted as an elementary integration interval for discriminating perceived
events. This threshold is modality-dependent. While the mentioned value of
approximately 3 msec refers to auditory perception, the fusion threshold in
visual and tactile perception is of the order of 10 msec [27].
(2) a so-called order threshold of approximately 30 msec which can be in-
terpreted as an elementary integration interval for the capability to assign
sequential order to perceived events. This modality-independent threshold
is often characterized as an extended period of nowness.
While the fusion threshold can be explained by transduction properties of
signals in the brain, a proper understanding of the order threshold remains a
topic of vivid discussion. Since its size (≈ 30 msec) is the same for different
modalities, it was speculated that the order threshold might be related to
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the problem of how pieces of information from an external event, which are
received in terms of different sensory modalities, are bound together such that
the external event is perceived as a whole (binding problem). In addition, the
approximate equivalence of ≈ 20–40 msec with ≈ 30–50 Hz (γ-band) brain
activity suggests that the order threshold could be related to collective neural
oscillations as first reported in [9, 11]. For a recent approach to understand
the relation between the order threshold and collective oscillations see [3].
The nature of the order threshold as an elementary integration interval
prevents the sequentialization of successive stimuli with a temporal interval
smaller than approximately 30 msec. This strongly suggests the idea to use
it as a generic lower bound of the time ∆T between successive observations
in the quantum Zeno effect. Observations with smaller temporal distance
cannot be perceptually time-ordered. The fact that the order threshold is
modality-independent and its fundamental significance for the binding prob-
lem add to the plausibility of this suggestion.
3.3 The significance of t0
In the quantum Zeno scenario, t0 is the oscillation period of the transition
process between the considered non-stationary states, under the assumption
that there is no observation and the evolution of the system is governed by
U(t). According to eq. 7 and setting C = 1, observation leads to an increase
of the effective oscillation time from t0 to
T =
t20
∆T
. (8)
With T ≈ 3 sec and ∆T ' 30 msec, this provides t0 ' 300 msec. Un-
der the influence of observations at a temporal distance of 30 msec, the
observation-free oscillation period of 300 msec due to U(t) is increased to an
oscillation period of 3 sec. It has to be understood, though, that the value
of t0 is as approximate as those of T and ∆T . A cognitive time scale corre-
sponding to t0 should, thus, be of the order of some hundred milliseconds.
Roughly speaking, this is the order of magnitude which is most often
discussed as the time required for a stimulus to become “conscious”. It es-
sentially consists of the time required for signal transduction from sensory
input to the relevant parts of the cortex plus “unconscious” preprocessing.
Neurophysiological studies with event-related potentials show a distinctive
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universal signature after approximately 300 msec, the so-called P300 com-
ponent, sometimes referring to additional features up to 900 msec [34, 8]. It
is independent of the specific stimulus and has been attributed to the fact
that the perception of a stimulus is a process demanding conscious atten-
tion (see [14] and references therein). From another perspective, it has been
proposed that any cognitive processing requires about 100 msec to lead to a
consciously available result [18], e.g. in terms of a representation.
The significance of the hundred millisecond time scale with respect to
the conscious availability of a mental representation offers an intuitive un-
derstanding of t0 in the cognitive context. In contrast to T , which represents
the “lifetime” (or mean first passage time) of each of the perceptual repre-
sentations, t0 can be regarded as the transition time between those represen-
tations. The relaxation into each one of the representations is much faster
than the lifetime in each representation due to the Zeno effect. Without Zeno
effect, the lifetime T would be more or less identical with the transition time
t0.
It has been observed that the lifetime T , i.e., the inverse switching rate,
for bistable Necker cube perception changes considerably if the stimulus is
presented in a non-continuous way [21]. Particular combinations of on- and
off-time intervals lead to a significantly enhanced value of T . Recent ob-
servations [14] show that T depends essentially on off-times rather than on
on-times. T is maximal for long off-times (on the order of a second).
The relation between ∆T , T and t0 implies that T increases if ∆T is
decreased or t0 is increased. Is it possible to interpret the situation for non-
continuous presentation in such a way that either ∆T or t0 is effectively
changed due to the discrete on- and off-times and, thus, leads to an increase
of T ?
Let us first consider the time scale ∆T ≈ 30 msec. It represents an
intrinsically (due to the operation of the cognitive system) given lower bound
to the time between observations. Therefore, it would be implausible to
consider significantly smaller values of ∆T . Moreover, there is no empirical
evidence at hand that an increase of ∆T could be forced by long off-times in
non-continuous presentation.
On the other hand, long off-times obviously increase the interval after
which a reversal of the Necker cube perception becomes possible at all. ¿From
the theoretical point of view outlined in Sec. 2, non-continuous presentation
of the Necker cube with considerable off-times effectively modifies the Hamil-
tonian of the system, leading to an increased oscillation time t0. In detail, this
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argument applies if off-times are greater than the value of t0 under continu-
ous presentation (with vanishing off-time). For non-continuous presentation,
off-times (provided they are long enough) can therefore be identified with t0
and utilized for an experimentally well-controlled variation of its numerical
value. For such a situation, Fig. 1 shows experimental results for ∆T = f(t0)
from [14, 21] together with a theoretically obtained curve according to eq. 8
and with ∆T = 70 msec. The theoretical curve fits the empirical results per-
fectly well. Using ∆T = 70 msec to estimate t0 for continuous presentation
provides t0 ≈ 460 msec.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1
0
2
4
6
8
10
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14
16
18
20
T 
(se
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t0 (sec)
Figure 1: Experimentally obtained lifetimes T (inverse switching rates) for
the bistable perception of a non-continuously presented Necker cube. Crosses
mark results from Kornmeier [14]: for each off-time t0, T (including standard
errors) is plotted for three on-times of 0.05 sec, 0.1 sec, and 0.4 sec. Squares
mark results from Orbach et al. [21] for an on-time of 0.3 sec (no errors
indicated in [21]). The plotted curve shows T as a function of off-times t0
according to eq. 8 with ∆T = 70 msec.
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4 Summary and conclusions
In the framework of a generalized, “weak” quantum theory, the quantum
Zeno effect was applied to the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli. In
this application to a phenomenon of cognitive science, which obviously ex-
ceeds the domain of standard quantum physics, the quantum feature of mea-
surement corresponds to the act of perception. The main result of this paper
is the derivation and cognitive interpretation of three crucial time scales:
∆T : the time between successive observations; as a lower bound for ∆T
in cognitive operations, the so-called order threshold of ≈ 30 msec is
proposed.
t0: the oscillation period for the switching process between two non-stationary
states under the unperturbed evolution of the system; t0 will be in-
creased to T if measurements are carried out.
T : the increased switching period for the case that measurements are carried
out; cognitively this corresponds to the switching period of ≈ 3 sec for
bistable perception under continuous presentation of the stimulus.
The quantum Zeno model establishes a relation between these three time
scales, yielding t0 ' 300 msec for ∆T ' 30 msec and T ≈ 3 sec under
the condition of continuous stimulus presentation. Such a value of t0 is
often discussed as the approximate size of the time interval after which the
processing of sensory inputs leads to a consciously available result, i.e. a
mental representation of the stimulus.
Non-continuous presentation of the Necker cube provides the possibility to
vary t0 in an experimentally controlled manner in terms of off-times between
stimulus presentation. Empirical results for T as a function of t0 support
the relation between the three times scales with respect to their cognitive
significance. However, further experimental material will be needed to firmly
establish the cognitive relevance of the quantum Zeno time scales.
Another prediction of the cognitive quantum Zeno effect is the existence
of superpositions c1ψ1 + c2ψ2 of the individual well-defined perception states
ψ1 and ψ2. It is presumably not easy to prepare and observe such superpo-
sition states. Nevertheless, they should appear at least as unstable, transi-
tional states between ψ1 and ψ2. Elsewhere [1] such states were tentatively
described as “acategoreal” states, indicating that they do not encode catego-
real representations in the usual sense of cognitive science. In [15], a specific
15
neural correlate of such states was for the first time reported in terms of an
early (250 msec) component in event-related potentials.
An interesting option for the preparation of superposition states is the
perception of paradoxical rather than ambiguous figures. In this case, the
key idea is that both alternatives of perception operate as repellors rather
than attractors, thus pushing the state of the system toward the unstable
superposition in between them. So far, no experimental material is available
concerning such a scenario.
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